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Will Women Save more than Men? 





This paper presents an inter-temporal model of individual behavior with uncertainty about 
marriage and divorce and which accommodates the possible presence of economies or 
diseconomies of scale from marriage. We show that a scenario of higher marriage rates and 
higher divorce rates will be associated with higher savings rates in the presence of economies 
of marriage and with lower savings rates in the presence of diseconomies of marriage. In the 
context of traditional gender roles, this implies higher saving rates by young men and lower 
saving rates by young women than in less traditional countries, the opposite being the case 
with saving rates of married women relative to those of married men. We establish the 
relevance of traditional gender roles and marital status to understanding cross-country 
variation in gender differentials in savings behavior. 
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1.   Introduction  
Personal  savings  behavior  is  a  very  important  variable  influencing  economic  growth. 
Conventional  economic  theory,  however,  does  not  seem  to  provide  a  good  understanding  of  the 
determinants  of  personal  savings.  For  instance,  there  are  currently  no  good  explanations  for  the 
considerable decrease in personal savings rates observed in the United States over the last few decades 
from around 12% in the middle 1970s to the current 2.7% [see, for example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff 
(1990),  Hungerford  (2006),  and  Guidolin  and  La  Jeunesse  (2007)]  or  for  the  large  differences  in 
household  savings  traditionally  observed  among  industrialized  countries  [on  average  over  the  last 
decade personal savings rates were, according to OECD (2009), close to zero for Australia, Denmark, 
and Finland, around 5% for Japan and Korea, and over 10% for France and Germany, for example].  
Some of the most commonly used explanations for variations in household savings are related 
to demography and family decision-making. Demographic characteristics are expected to influence 
savings to the extent that the motives for savings - such as the desire to prepare for retirement, to 
bequest, or to fund education - vary over the life-cycle. Using a life-cycle model of consumption and 
savings,  economists  have  previously  related  savings  to,  for  example,  the  age  structure o f  t h e  
population, life expectancy, and labor force participation rate of the aged [see, for example, Horioka 
(1989, 1997), Horioka and Wan (2007), and Horioka and Terada-Hagiwara (2010)], retirement age, 
family size, percent of working age population [see, for example, Smith (1990)], and percent of women 
in the labor force (see, for example, Apps and Rees (2010)].  
The  focus  of  this  paper  is  on  a  particular  demographic  characteristic:  marital  status. 
Economists have written about the effect of marriage considerations on savings. Men preparing for 
marriage appear to save more [see Horioka (1987) on the effects of marriage-related expenses on 
savings and Du and Wei (2010) on the effects of high sex ratios on savings]. That marriage and divorce 
are related to savings has also been established, for example, by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1990) and   2 
Lupton and Smith (2003). In this paper we examine the role of both marriage [understood as including 
cohabitation] and divorce [understood as including separation and widowhood]. Our theoretical model 
stands  out  in  that  it  simultaneously  models  the  marriage  and  savings  decisions.  It  offers  a  novel 
perspective by incorporating in an inter-temporal model of savings behavior under uncertainty several 
factors related to couple formation: the likelihood of marriage, the likelihood of divorce, and the 
presence of economies or diseconomies from marriage. 
The key role of economies or diseconomies from marriage in our model is suggested by the 
mixed evidence in the empirical literature on the gender differentials in savings behavior.  Women save 
more than men according to a number of studies based, for example, on data from South Korea [see 
Kim  (1997)  and  Lee  and  Pocock  (2007)],  Kenya  [Anderson  and  Baland  (2002)]  and  the  US 
[Hungerford  (1999)].  Seguino  and  Floro  (2003)  analyzed  a  panel  data  set  for  semi-industrialized 
countries and showed that the higher women’s income is relative to that of men, the higher is a 
country’s gross domestic savings rate. However, when Phipps and Woolley (2008) estimated midlife 
men and women’s probability of ever having contributed to a ‘Registered Retirement Savings Plan’ (or 
RRSP, a Canadian cousin of IRA programs in the US) they found that greater female control was 
associated with a lower probability of having contributed, as well as lower contribution levels. They 
also found that an increase in male earnings had a much larger effect on total savings into this kind of 
retirement plan than an equivalent increase in female earnings. It is also the case that according to the 
2008 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (Statistics Bureau, Japan, 2008), single men save more 
than single women in Japan.  
Our  model  attempts  to  reconcile  some  of  these  apparent  contradictions  in  the  empirical 
literature. In the context of traditional gender roles, marriage entails economies of marriage for women 
and diseconomies of marriage for men. Our model incorporates such gender asymmetry and therefore 
accommodates  different  savings  behavior  by  young  single  men,  relative  to  those  of  young  single   3 
women, and different savings behavior by married women relative to those of married men. In cultures 
with more egalitarian gender roles we expect fewer gender differences in savings rates at both youth 
and midlife. As a result, cross-cultural variation in norms regarding gender roles in the household could 
possibly explain gender differences in savings rates.  
While we view marriages like firms composed of individuals who produce together and/or 
consume together, in the tradition of the New Home Economics pioneered by Becker (1960, 1965) and 
Mincer (1962, 1963), our model’s decision-makers are individuals who can be either single, married, or 
single again (via divorce or death). The income from which they save is their individual disposable 
income. Economies or diseconomies of marriage expand or reduce the purchasing power of individual 
income. Our analysis builds on Becker’s (1973) pioneering economic analyses of marriage and on 
economic models analyzing intra-marriage transfers as compensations for work in marital household 
production, such as Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman (1988).  
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the analytical model.  In section 3 
we present the analytical results on the impact of changes in the probability of marriage on the savings 
rate of agents at different stages of their lives.  In section 4 we do the same with changes in the 
probability of divorce.  Finally, in section 5 we discuss some of the empirical implications of our results 
and provide suggestions for future work. 
 
2.     The Analytical Framework 
We consider households as composed of individual agents, even if married. Our stylized agent 
– a male or a female - lives for three periods: youth, or period 1, midlife, or period 2, and old age, or 
period  3.    The  agent  maximizes  an  individual  inter-temporal  utility  function  (1)  defined  on 
consumption ci with i = 1, 2, and 3. Various potential marital states are possible. In case of marriage, 
both private and household public goods, i.e., goods consumed jointly with the spouse, are possibly   4 
consumed by the agent, but we don’t formally distinguish between the two types of goods. The utility 
function  is  assumed  to  satisfy  positive  marginal  utility,  decreasing  marginal  utility,  and  constant 
absolute risk aversion. Future consumption is discounted by a factor δ that captures impatience.  
 
(1)   
 
This utility function is maximized subject to budget constraints for each of the three periods.  
The agent can derive income from two sources: work or interest on past savings. It is assumed that the 
agent  earns  the  same  wage  w  in  every  one  of  the  three  periods,  which  assumes  inter-temporal 
smoothing of earnings. Savings earn a return r. In the absence of intergenerational altruism and/or 
uncertainty as to the time of death, there are no savings in period 3.  
The  model  considers  that  individual  agents  continue  to  make  their  own  consumption  and 
savings  decisions  whether  married  or  single.  Marriage  is  defined  as  being-in-couple  and  includes 
cohabitation, and accordingly, divorce includes separation where individuals did not tie the knot. We 
assume that the agent is unmarried in the first period.  There is a probability   that the agent will 
remain single in the second period, the alternative being to marry. There is a probability   that the 
agent will be single, widowed, or divorced in the third period.  For the sake of simplicity we will refer 
to  as the probability of divorce. It is assumed that   and   are exogenous and independent, that 
the divorced state is equivalent to the single state, that agents can not marry in period 3, and that 
divorce does not entail either extra expenses or extra income.  In periods 2 and 3 (midlife and old age), 
the budget constraint depends on marital status of the agent. 
Consumption  and  savings  are  personal,  not  household  based.  From  a  purchasing  power 
perspective, an agent can benefit from marriage to the extent that the agent has access to the spouse’s 
)
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income to buy goods consumed by the agent. How much the agent benefits from spousal earnings is 
captured by an ‘economies of marriage’ parameter, γ. In the case of γ = 1 marital status does not affect 
the consumption value of earnings w. This could be a situation where the agent is single or a situation 
where married people’s earnings generate neither economies of marriage nor diseconomies of marriage.  
If γ  > 1 there are economies of marriage in the sense that in the married state individual 
income w can generate more consumption and savings for agents than if they were to stay single. One 
possible  reason  for  the  economies  of  marriage  is  that  the  individual  expects  to  obtain  a  higher 
disposable income after marriage, via access to his or her spouse’s income. Alternatively, the spouse 
may purchase goods benefiting this individual’s private consumption or his consumption of household 
public goods. Such intra-marriage transfers of income may be the result of that agent doing more work 
in household production and getting compensation for such work from the spouse. In a context in 
which leisure does not enter the utility function, such division of labor within the household is an 
economy of marriage to the person doing the household production work.  
In contrast, if γ < 1, there are diseconomies of marriage in the sense that in the married state 
individual income w has a lower purchasing power for agents than if they were to stay single. This 
could include a situation where the agent’s income is used to ‘pay’ the spouse and the spouse buys 
goods that don’t benefit the agent, so that the consumption value of the agent's income is lower than 
what it would be if the agent were single. Another possibility is the case in which the spouse does not 
participate in the labor force and therefore does not have independent income.   
Given these considerations, the budget constraints for the three periods can be written as: 
 
 (2)     
     with probability     6 
   with probability (1- ) 
       with probability   
     with probability (1- ) 
 
The optimal level of savings in the first two periods is obtained by maximizing (1) subject to (2) 
and can be presented in general terms as: 
   
where, 
 
(3)   
     
 
Given the properties of the utility function   are determined by  
(4)   
(5)     
 
 
Let these first order conditions be denoted in an implicit form by   
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(5’)   
 
Functions (4’)-(5’) represent savings rates implicitly, where  , with i = 
1,2. The effects of the different arguments on savings behavior can be obtained by using the implicit 
function theorem and the related information presented in the Appendix. 
 
 
3.     On the Effects of Changes in the Probability of Marriage on Savings Behavior 
We now consider the effects of changes in the probability of marriage ( ) on savings in 
both youth and mid-life and thereby on lifetime savings. 
 
Proposition 1 [Effects of changes in the probability of marriage on savings at youth] Savings at 
youth  decrease  with  the  probability  of  marriage  if  there  are  economies  of  marriage and  increase  with  the 
probability of marriage if there are no economies of marriage . 
 
Proof: Using standard techniques we obtain 
 
(6)   
 
It can be shown that 
 
where the term in the square bracket is positive. Furthermore, the reason why the sign is ambiguous is 
because   regardless of the value of  .   8 
Now it can be shown that: 
 
 
From  the  derivatives  above  and  (A.2’)  it  can  be  seen  that ,  where 
 (numerator is lower in absolute value than the denominator).  
Accordingly,  
 
                  QED 
 
The  intuition  behind  Proposition  1  is  clear.    Economies  of  marriage  are  interpreted  as 
situations where marriage helps stretch the value of each dollar earned by the agent.  In this case, the 
agents save less in youth in preparation for marriage, since they anticipate with a higher probability a 
state of the world with a higher purchasing power. The reverse is true in the presence of diseconomies 
of marriage.  
 
 
Proposition 2 [Effects of changes in the probability of marriage on savings in midlife] Savings in 
midlife increase with the probability of marriage if the agent experiences economies of marriage . In contrast, if 
marriage generates diseconomies , midlife savings decrease with the probability of marriage. 
Proof:    9 
(7)   
 
It can be shown that 
 





From the derivatives above and (A.6) it can be seen that , where 





The predicted impact of a change in the probability of marriage on individual savings in midlife 
goes in a direction that is opposite to that of the predicted impact of a change in the probability of 
marriage on individual savings in youth.  An agent who expects marriage to be a costly proposition due 
to diseconomies of marriage will be savings more in youth, before marriage, as he or she anticipates a   10 
drain  on  earnings  after  marriage.  However,  once  married  and  actually  experiencing  the  drain  on 
earnings, such individuals will be savings less than a comparable single. In contrast, the individual 
facing economies of marriage will be savings less in youth, before marriage, and more in mid-life, after 
marriage. Effectively, economies of marriage amount to a higher income to save from.   
We now turn to the effect of marriage on lifetime savings. As we have shown, a change in the 
probability of marriage has opposite effects on savings at youth and midlife. Accordingly, a relevant 
question is whether or not anything can be said about the overall effect of the probability of marriage 
on the present value of lifetime savings, i.e., what we can we say about  . The sign of 
the aggregate effect is, in general, ambiguous. It is possible, however, to identify a definite sign in the 
following particular, but rather interesting, case.   
 
Proposition 3 [Effects of changes in the probability of marriage on lifetime savings] Consider an 
agent with a relatively high rate of impatience (  sufficiently lower than  ). Then, an increase in the probability 
of marriage increases the present value of lifetime savings for agents experiencing economies of marriage and decreases that 
present value if there are no economies of marriage [unless both the probability of divorce and economies of marriage are 
very low]. 
Proof:  
From (6), (7), (A.3), and (A.8) 
 
In turn, using (A.1) and (A.7)  
   11 
 
Suppose now that the rate of time impatience is such that  and as assumed that 
 displays constant relative risk aversion c, such that .  
In this case  
 
 
Notice that , and from concavity of , for a sufficiently high , the 
sign of the above expression is negative.  Moreover, if , then the sign of the above equation is 
unambiguously negative since the first two terms are a convex combination of two terms each of 
which is lower than the third term in absolute value.  In this case the magnitude of the probability of 
divorce does not matter.  On the other hand, if , the sign of the equation will also be negative 
unless both and are very low. 
It should be noted that in reality one would expect .  For the results to hold it is 
sufficient that the discount rate is sufficiently low (the rate of time impatience is sufficiently high) for 
the above expression not to be much larger than one. 
QED 
 
This result establishes that for a relatively impatient agent the present value of lifetime savings 
increases with the probability of marriage in the presence of economies of marriage and decreases in 
the presence of diseconomies of marriage. Overall, economies of marriage represent higher lifetime 
purchasing power for a married agent.  Despite the fact that they save less when they are young they   12 
end up savings proportionally more when they are mature. Intuitively, a high degree of impatience 
guarantees that savings are reduced less at youth than are increased at maturity.  
The  opposite  is  true  for  agents  with  diseconomies  of  marriage.  An  interesting  exception, 
however, is that even for such agents if the probability of divorce and diseconomies are very low, an 
increase in the probability of marriage will also increase lifetime savings.  Intuitively, the diseconomies 
of marriage are dramatic and the likelihood of returning to a higher purchasing power state of the 
world  is  small  so  overall  anticipated  future  purchasing  power  from  marriage  is  relatively  low  and 
greater savings are required. 
 
4.   On the Effects of Changes in the Probability of Divorce on Savings Behavior 
 
Proposition 4 [Effect of the probability of divorce on savings] Savings of agents throughout their lifetimes 
decrease with the probability of divorce if there are diseconomies of marriage .  If there are economies of marriage 
a higher probability of divorce affects savings positively. Furthermore, the probability of divorce affects savings 
behavior (negatively or positively) the most at midlife. 
Proof: 
(8)     
(9)     
Notice that given the results above,  
 
which is positive if  and negative if  .    13 
Notice also that from (A.1) and (A.2),  , which implies that  , i.e., the 
probability of divorce affects savings behavior (negatively or positively) more at midlife than in youth.  
QED. 
 
The intuition behind this proposition is that agents expecting diseconomies of marriage will view 
divorce as representing higher income. Therefore, for such agents the more likely divorce is, the less 
they  have  to  save  to  hedge  against  future  states  of  the  world.  In  contrast,  individuals  expecting 
economies from marriage will save more if they expect a higher probability of divorce in anticipation 
of a more likely state of the world with a lower purchasing power.  
 
5.    Concluding Remarks and Directions for Future Work 
In this paper we present an inter-temporal model of individual behavior with uncertainty about 
marriage and divorce in which we accommodate the existence of economies or diseconomies of scale 
from marriage. We show, in general, that a scenario of higher marriage rates and higher divorce rates is 
associated with higher savings rates in the presence of economies of marriage and with lower savings 
rates  in  the  presence  of  diseconomies  of  marriage.  Accordingly,  the  existence  of  economies  or 
diseconomies of marriage plays a central role in the determination of savings behavior of different 
agents at different life-cycle stages.   
Our results have important empirical implications in terms of observed gender differences in 
savings behavior. In a society with traditional gender roles, being male or female will affect whether 
agents expect economies or diseconomies of marriage. In traditional societies, women are expected to 
perform most of the home production in marriage, husbands earn more than wives, and men make 
more of their earnings available to their spouses than women do. As a result, traditional gender roles   14 
translate in our model into men experiencing diseconomies of marriage, and women experiencing 
economies of marriage.  
It follows from our results that under traditional gender roles at the pre-marriage stage, women 
will save more if they expect to stay single than if they expect to marry, and men will save more if they 
expect to marry than if they expect to stay single. It also follows that in traditional societies single men 
will have higher savings rates than single women.  Consider the case of Japan. As shown, for example, 
by Hendry (1985), Japan has a traditional culture in which most household production responsibilities 
fall on women while men are expected to share more of their income with their wives than the other 
way around. As predicted by our model, the savings rate of salaried single male workers aged 34 or 
younger was 31.9 percent, compared to 22.4 percent for single women according to the Family Income 
and Expenditure Survey (2008).   
In contrast, it also follows from our results that in traditional societies at midlife men will save 
less and women will save more the more they are likely to be married. It is also likely that married 
women’s propensity to save will exceed that of men. This helps explain why in South Korea, another 
traditional society, Lee and Pocock (2007) found that the higher the fraction of earnings earned by 
women, the more couples saved and that among dual-earner couples the individual savings of wives 
exceeded those of husbands.  
Our results also suggest that the opposite patterns of savings behavior will occur in populations 
with more egalitarian gender roles. For instance, our analysis helps explain why among a sample of 
couples interviewed in Ottawa, Canada, in 1995 (Phipps and Woolley 2008) women saved less relative 
to their husbands than did married women in a nationally representative South Korean sample. Phipps 
and Woolley (2008) showed that the more Canadian women earned relative to their mates, the less 
households  saved  in  the  form  of  retirement  accounts.  Also,  according  to  that  study,  women  had 
smaller amounts of savings if they had financial control than if that control was in the hands of their   15 
husbands. Given that Ottawa is a government town, this Canadian sample was highly educated, and in 
North  America  high  education  tends  to  be  positively  associated  with  egalitarian  gender  roles. 
Interestingly, an analysis by Hungerford (1999) of individual contributions to 401(K) pension plans in 
the United States, also performed in 1995, showed that women participants had significantly higher 
contribution  rates  to  their  plans  than  men,  possibly  reflecting  the  fact  that  the  sample  of  U.S. 
households was broader and less educated - and therefore more traditional - than the Canadian sample. 
Also, the U.S. sample was not limited to couples and covered a wide age range, and we expect gender 
differentials to vary with life-cycle stage and marital status.  
While our results establish the conceptual relevance and potential empirical significance of 
marital status and economies and diseconomies of marriage in understanding differences in savings 
behavior,  the  results  in  this  paper  should  be  regarded  as  just  a  first  look  at  the  rather  complex 
interaction  of  marriage  and  savings  behavior.  From  a  conceptual  perspective,  the  theoretical 
underpinning of the model should be refined to allow for richer results and more detailed testable 
implications.  For example, we assume that the rate at which agents share their income with their 
spouses  is  given.  This  assumption  is  related  to  our  assumption  that  utility  is  solely  generated  by 
commercial consumption goods, and not by home produced goods. One should therefore consider a 
fuller model that places home-produced goods in the utility function and takes account of how the 
economies of marriage are related to the incentives for home production - for instance, women getting 
more access to their husbands’ income are likely to produce more home-produced goods.  In addition, 
further research should relax the assumption of constant earnings over the lifetime of the agent, which 
excludes  gender  differences  in  earnings.  This  would  enrich  the  possibility  of  gender  comparisons.  
Finally, we ignore the costs of divorce.  Clearly, it is not simply the divorce rate that influences savings, 
but also what the anticipated property settlements are in case of divorce. Further work should also 
examine the possible connection between savings rates and regime of property division.   16 
It could be extremely interesting to determine the extent to which the predictions of this model 
can help explain observed differences in savings behavior – along the life cycle, across genders, and 
across countries. In particular, future research should include a full analysis of male/female differences 
in savings rates at youth and at midlife using a cross-country sample. It follows from our models that 
such analysis of gender-specific and overall savings rates should take account not only of marriage rates 
and divorce rates, but also of degree of traditionalism in the definition of gender roles. It may be 
helpful to use a measure of such traditionalism of the type incorporated in the research of Sevilla-Sanz 
(2010).  
Finally, this line of research has the potential for rather strong implications from a public policy 
perspective. It could establish to what degree more structural patterns of social behavior are at the root 
of the lack of effectiveness of conventional policy instruments, such as tax incentives, when it comes to 
promoting personal savings [see, for example, Tanzi and Zee (1998) and Hungerfort (2006)].   
   17 
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APPENDIX 
 
To study the effects of changes in the probabilities of marriage and divorce on savings behavior we use 
the implicit function theorem.  The determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the first order conditions 
with respect to  and  , that is (4’) and (5’), is positive, i.e.,  . This is a direct requirement 
of the optimization problem in that it relates to the strict concavity of the objective function with 
respect to the decision variables   and  . Furthermore, since , the conditions of the 
implicit function theorem are also satisfied.  To obtain the necessary information for the identification 
of the effects on savings behavior we totally differentiate   and   as given by (4’) and (5’) to obtain: 
 
(A.1)   
 
(A.2)   
 
From (A.1) and (A.2) it follows that   
(A.2’)   
 
(A.3)   
 








From (A.1), (A.2), and (A.6) it follows that  
(A.6’)  
, 
where given (A.1)  the first term has a negative sign.  
 
(A.7)   
From (A.3) and (A.7) it follows that . Accordingly these two derivatives will always 
have the opposite sign regardless of . 
 
(A.8)     
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